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The federal Credit CARD Act is a setback for the
rights of young people.
University of Colorado
In the middle ages, the English courts held that one Is an "infant"in the eyes of the law until age 21. This rule persisted until
the late 2 0 th century, when Americans came to believe that if
18-year-olds are "old enough to fight" in Vietnam, they should
be treated as adults under the law. Thus, in 1971, the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which lowered the voting
age from 21 to 18, was proposed and ratified in just three months,
making it the fastest amendment to be ratified in American his-
tory. At the same time, the minimum age for federal and state jury
service was lowered from 21 to 18. And, with regard to contract
law, every state passed legislation reducing the age of contractual
capacity to 18. Though all of those reforms remain in place, the
federal Credit CARD Act of2009 (CARD Act) established 21 as the
minimum age to contract for a credit card.
This article criticizes this "infancy rule" of the CARD Act,
found in section 301, for two reasons. First, in the late 20th
century, Americans decided that 18-year-olds are adults who
deserve to be treated with dignity by the law, and that view has
not changed. This basic principle was the driving force behind the
Twenty-Sixth Amendment, as well as state and federal statutes
that lowered the age for jury service and contractual capacity to
18. In declaring all those under 21 to be infants, section 301 runs
badly afoul of this broad societal consensus, rolls back the clock
ANDREW A. SCHWARTZ is an associate professor of law at the
University of Colorado.
This article is based on Schwartz's paper "Old Enough to Fight, Old
Enough to Swipe: A Critique of the Infancy Rule in the Federal Credit
CARD Act," Utah Law Review, Vol. 2011, No. 2.
to medieval times, and undermines the dignity of 18-year-olds.
Second, separate and apart from the harm section 301 directly
inflicts on young people, the CARD Act's infancy rule hurts
society at large. This is because the state statutory reforms of
the 1970s that endowed 18-year-olds with the capacity to enter
into binding contracts ushered in the new and hugely beneficial
phenomenon of youthful entrepreneurship. Young people, age
18-20, were able to obtain credit and found start-up companies.
Such youthful entrepreneurs included Bill Gates, who founded
Microsoft, and Mark Zuckerberg, who founded Facebook, both
at age 19. These and other youthful start-ups employ hundreds
of thousands of people and their products and services improve
our lives. Under section 301 of the CARD Act, however, they
likely never would have been launched. In short, by hampering
youthful entrepreneurship, section 301 harms not only the young
themselves, but society as a whole.
This article will recount the history of legal adulthood, focus-
ing on four areas-voting, jury service, death penalty eligibility,
and contracting-and elaborate on how extending the right to
contract to 18-year-olds created a new class of youthful entre-
preneurs. Then it will describe section 301 of the CARD Act
and criticize it for contradicting our modern view of adulthood
and undermining socially beneficial youthful entrepreneurship.
Finally, this article will conclude with a call to repeal section 301.
From as far back as precedents stretch, our law has always
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imposed a minimum age for engaging in weighty aspects of
public and private life, such as serving as a juror, voting, and
making contracts. This is known as the "infancy" doctrine. The
underlying policy of the rule is, of course, that children lack the
necessary maturity and experience to be trusted to make sen-
sible choices on important subjects, such as whether to impose
the death penalty on a fellow citizen.
But where should the line between infancy and adulthood
be drawn? A 4-year-old is clearly an infant and a 40-year-old
is clearly an adult. But what about
close cases, like that of a precocious
17-year-old who lives with her parents
but has already graduated from col-
lege? Beginning in the 13th century,
the common-law courts universally
embraced a flat rule that legal adult-
hood begins at 21 years, regardless of
the actual level of maturity of the per-
son at issue. The age of2l was initially
selected because, at the time, Eng-
lishmen were eligible for knighthood
only upon achieving 21 years of age.
Apparently, the suits of armor worn
by English knights were so heavy that
only at age 21 could most young men
be expected to bear it. Thus under the
common law a person becomes an
adult, with full legal capacity, when
he turns 21.
This rule remained remarkably
stable from the Middle Ages until
well into the 20th century. But in
the late 1960s and early 1970s, the
idea that all persons under 21 were
infants was widely examined and
discussed-and rejected. After several
years of public debate and delibera-
tion, American society came to the
collective conclusion that the legal
age of majority should be reduced
to 18. In light of this new consensus,
the U.S. Constitution and the statu-
tory law of every state were amended
to declare that infancy ends at 18.
Those amendments, and the con-
sensus behind them, remain firmly
in place today.
The reduction in the age of adult-
hood to 18 played out in numerous
arenas, including voting, jury service,
death eligibility, and-most impor-
tantly for present purpose-contract-
ing. Each will be examined in turn.
Suffrage | From the founding of this nation until quite recently,
a minimum voting age of 21 was imposed in all state and fed-
eral elections. Limiting the franchise to those over 21 may have
made sense in medieval England or pre-industrial America. But
in the 20th century, the U.S. Congress decreed for the first time
that males age 18 and older were eligible to be drafted into the
military. This created an incongruity in the law: an 18-year-old
could be called to fight-and possibly die-for a government
that he was powerless to change. Taxation without representa-
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tion looked pretty good by comparison.
So when many Americans (or their loved ones) enlisted or
were drafted to fight in World War II and the Korean War in the
1940s and 1950s, President Dwight Eisenhower and others began
to express the idea that "if a man is old enough to fight, he is old
enough to vote." Even so, the prevailing view of lawmakers and
their constituents in the immediate post-war years remained
what it had been for centuries, namely that the voting age should
be 21. Thus nearly every legislative proposal in the 1950s and
1960s to lower the voting age to 18 was defeated and, as late as
1970, every state except four continued to restrict suffrage to
those age 21 and older, as did federal law.
But then came the Vietnam War, which changed everything.
Once again, a military engagement called attention to the
injustice of subjecting 18-year-olds to the draft but denying
them the ballot. This time, however, the movement to lower the
voting age to 18 was carried along as part of the massive civil
rights, antiwar, counterculture, and other social movements of
the late 1960s and early 1970s.
They took up the slogan, "Old
enough to fight, old enough
to vote," which seemed par-
ticularly poignant with regard




ages 18-20. Under those cir-
cumstances, it seemed absurd to many Americans that the right
to vote in the 20th century was still governed by the weight of
armor in the 13th century. All of this was a sea change from the
view of 18-year-olds as infants that prevailed from the Middle
Ages through the 1950s.
By the late 1960s, the public overwhelmingly favored lowering
the voting age to 18. And their elected officials acted accordingly.
In 1970, a bipartisan Congress amended the Voting Rights Act
to make 18 the minimum voting age for all state and federal elec-
tions. Later that year, however, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
Congress lacked the power to lower the minimum age to vote in
state, as opposed to federal, elections. A constitutional amend-
ment would be required.
The U.S. Constitution is difficult to amend, as a proposed
amendment must be approved by two-thirds of both houses of
Congress and then ratified by three-quarters of the states. But in
early 1971, a near-unanimous Congress proposed the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment, which extended suffrage to all citizens "eighteen
years of age or older." Within just 100 days, it was ratified by the
requisite number of states-the fastest ratification in the history
of the Constitution. The people had spoken, loudly and clearly:
18-year-olds are adults, not infants, and therefore must be guaran-
teed the right to vote. And so they are, under the law of every state.
Jury service |Jury service followed a parallel trajectory to suf-
frage and, indeed, was part and parcel of the same legal reform.
As with voting, the minimum age for federal and state jury ser-
vice traditionally was 21 years, based on the general common-law
rule that a person becomes an adult at that age. But when the
modern view of infancy emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, classify-
ing 18-year-olds as adults, not infants, it logically followed that
the minimum age to serve on ajury should be lowered to 18. And
so it was, in nearly every state and under federal law.
On the federal level, the federalJury Selection and Service Act
was amended in 1972 to reduce the minimum age for federal jury
service from 21 to 18. The legislative history of the federal amend-
ment indicates that support for this change-which had already
been made in 20 states by then-was bipartisan and unanimous.
And as for state law, nearly every state has by now passed legisla-
tion reducing the minimum age for jury service to 18.
Death penalty eligibility | Being treated as an adult does not
always redound to the benefit of 18-year-olds. Nowhere is this
clearer than in the case of the ultimate criminal sanction, the
death penalty. In the landmark case ofRoper v. Simmons, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
the imposition of the death penalty on a 17-year-old child, but
permits the execution of 18-year-olds. The Court's rationale
should be familiar by now: "The age of 18 is the point where
society draws the line for many purposes between childhood
and adulthood." Accordingly, 18-year-olds, as a class, are suf-
ficiently mature and sophisticated to be held fully responsible
for their crimes.
Capacity to contract | Voting and jury service are important
civic rights and duties, but the protesting youth of the 1960s
and 1970s wanted more than just the right to participate in
their government. They also wanted "a piece of the action"-
that is, an opportunity to make investments or to start a busi-
ness of their own. But contract law has always held that infants
lack the requisite mental "capacity" to bind themselves by
contract and, under the traditional common-law rule, everyone
under 21 was an infant. The result of this confluence of rules
was a legal prohibition on 18-, 19-, and 20-year-olds grabbing
"a piece of the action" for themselves.
That infants lack capacity to contract follows from first prin-
ciples of contract law. The nature of a contractual duty is that
it is assumed freely and voluntarily. Therefore both parties to a
contract must have the mental "capacity" to bind themselves for
their agreement to be legally enforceable. Certain classes of peo-
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ple are held as a matter of law to always lack capacity to contract,
including the mentally ill and, most notably for present purposes,
infants. The underlying idea is not hard to understand. Infants
are, by definition, immature and inexperienced, and therefore
need to be protected.
This is not to say that the common law prohibits infants from
contracting or that a contract with an infant is void or "illegal" in
some sense. Rather, the common-law infancy rule-designed as it
is for the protection of the infant-holds that an infant's contract
is voidable at her election. So if a contract turns out to be good
for the infant, she can enforce it against the counterparty; but if
it turns out bad for the infant, the counterparty cannot enforce
it against her.
At first blush, this seems purely beneficial to the infant. But
the practical result of a judicial refusal to hold infants to their
promises was that no one was willing to contract with them. The
common law's paternalism toward infants excluded them from
the commercial world. Without the capacity to contract, one
cannot purchase inventory or engage employees, let alone borrow
money or enter into a stockholder agreement; entrepreneurship
is out of the question.
This state of affairs persisted for centuries until the late 1960s,
when 18- to 20-year-olds demanded to be treated, by the law, as
adults with full capacity to contract. Americans in the Vietnam
era overwhelmingly agreed that, just as 18-year-olds were entitled
as adults to vote and serve as jurors, they should likewise have
the right to enter into contracts of their own choosing. With the
nation unified on that point, states started to enact legislation
lowering the age of contractual capacity to 18, and by now all 50
states have lowered the age.
This change in the law of contracts confirms our modern
view that adulthood begins at 18. Moreover, it has had a pro-
found impact on our society: it created a new class of youthful
entrepreneurs.
For centuries, the law was clear that a person could not enter
into binding contracts until reaching 21 years of age. This had
the practical effect of denying those younger than 21 the ability
to start their own business. Even the greatest entrepreneurs in
American history had to wait until reaching 21 (or partner with
their parents) to found their ventures.
In 1810, for example, when Cornelius Vanderbilt sought to
start a ferry business at the tender age of 16, he was not able to do
so on his own. Rather, he was forced to partner with his father. In
1858, when John D. Rockefeller was 19, his father partnered with
him to found a commission merchant business; it took several
more years, when he was 23, for Rockefeller to go into the oil
refining business on his own, and he did not found Standard Oil
until he was 30. Other stories can be told: Andrew Carnegie began
making investments on his own when he was in his 20s; Levi
Strauss opened his San Francisco dry goods store when he was 24.
But when the age of capacity to contract was reduced to 18 in
the early 1970s, it gave rise to a new social phenomenon: the youth-
ful entrepreneur. Once 18- to 20-year-olds were empowered with
the capacity to enter into legally binding contracts, some of them
decided to launch business ventures of their own, something they
never before in history had the chance to do. Many of these young
people surely failed. But some youthful start-up companies have
succeeded in a spectacular fashion, employing tens of thousands
and creating products and services that have changed the world.
One of the first, and still among the most famous, youthful
entrepreneurs is Bill Gates, the founder of Microsoft. In 1975,
Gates left Harvard after his freshman year and moved to New
Mexico to launch the company that would become Microsoft. It
all began with a licensing agreement between Gates, Paul Allen,
and a company called Micro Instrumentation and Telemetry
Systems, signed on July 22, 1975-when Gates was only 19 years
old. This agreement would not have been enforceable (and there-
fore would never have been made) under the common-law rule
that the 19-year-old Gates was an infant. But New Mexico had
enacted a statute in 1971-just four years previous-that over-
ruled the common law and empowered Gates to found one of
the most successful companies of all time.
Similarly, in 1983, Michael Dell went into the computer
hardware business when he was a freshman at the University of
Texas. A 1973 Texas statute had endowed all persons with the
legal capacity to contract at age 18, and Dell took full advantage
of the opportunity denied to countless young people before him.
At just 18 years ofage, Dell bid for and won government contracts
to supply computers to the State ofTexas-something that surely
would have been unthinkable just a generation before. Shortly
thereafter, he dropped out of college and founded the company
that is now Dell Inc.
Finally, there is the story of Facebook, founded in 2004 by
Mark Zuckerberg, then a 19-year-old Harvard sophomore, and
his classmate. The online social network created by Facebook,
which consists of hundreds of millions of users, has changed the
way in which people interact with one another and even played
a role in the recent "Arab Spring" uprisings in the Middle East.
All of this is to say that the 1970s statutory revolution that
lowered the age of contractual capacity to 18 has had a tremen-
dously beneficial effect both for the newly empowered youths
and for society as a whole. Unleashing the energy and creativity
of 18- to 20-year-olds into the commercial realm has led to whole
new categories of products and services that never would have
occurred to older entrepreneurs, and the start-up companies
founded by these youthful entrepreneurs grow the economy and
create jobs. Thus, while suffrage may have gotten all the attention,
the biggest impact of our revised notion of infancy may be in the
economic sphere rather than in the political arena.
In the 1960s and 1970s, American society came to a consen-
sus that the age of legal majority should be lowered to 18, as
evidenced by the Twenty-Sixth Amendment and statutory
Spring 2012 | REGULATION
PERSONAL FINANCE
enactments overruling the common law in every state. This
consensus remains firmly in place today, as evidenced by the
fact that not a single state has tinkered with the new statutory
age for voting, jury service, or contracting.
In 2009, however, Congress overruled every one of those
statutes by enacting section 301 of the federal Credit CARD Act
of 2009. The section reinstates-for credit card contracts-the
ancient common-law rule that those under 21 are infants lacking
capacity to contract. Indeed, the act's prohibition is even harsher
than the common-law rule. Under the common law, a contract
with an infant is merely voidable by the infant, but the CARD
Act renders a credit card contract with an infant void even if she
would have preferred to abide by it. Furthermore, this change
in status for 18- to 20-year-olds was accomplished without any
significant public deliberation, let alone the type ofmassive social
movement observed in the 1960s and 1970s.
There are two important exceptions to the CARD Act's ban
on credit cards for infants. First, an infant under 21 years old
may contract for a credit card if someone else, 21 years or older,
cosigns and accepts joint liability for the infant's credit card debts.
Second, an infant may obtain a
credit card if she demonstrates
"independent means of repay-
ing" her debt. The upshot is
that independently wealthy
18-year-olds, or those whose
parents are willing and able to
accept joint liability, will still
be able to obtain a credit card.
But poor and middle-income
applicants may not. In short, 18- to 20-year-olds are now classified
by the law as adults with full capacity to enter into any contract-
except a credit card agreement.
Section 301 is a mistake for at least two reasons: First, it is
badly out of step with the modern consensus on adulthood and
harms 18- to 20-year-olds by treating them as infants. Second,
it will suppress socially beneficial youthful entrepreneurship,
particularly by those of modest backgrounds, and is therefore
contrary to the public interest.
Contradicting the modern view of adulthood I Section 301
conflicts directly with the statutory law of every state and the
national consensus that 18-year-olds are adults with the capac-
ity to make legally binding contracts. As discussed above, our
society wrestled in the 1960s and 1970s with the issue of when
a person crosses the legal line from infancy to adulthood-and
decided on a flat rule of 18 years.
Thanks to section 301, under current law an 18-year-old may
legally bind himself to a $10,000 loan, a $100,000 home mortgage,
or a $1 million stock purchase agreement-but not a credit card
with a $100 limit. This is absurd. If 18-year-olds are sufficiently
mature to make binding contracts of all other types (not to men-
tion elect our leaders, serve as our jurors, and receive the death
penalty for crimes)-and our societal consensus is that they are-
they are surely mature enough to hold a credit card.
Supporters of section 301 argue that 18-year-olds lack the
necessary maturity and sophistication to enter into a credit card
agreement. But this is nothing more than the same old paternal-
istic argument that has been statutorily rejected in every state.
And, as is often the case, this paternalistic policy has the perverse
effect of harming the very people it is intended to help. Credit
cards are ubiquitous in our society, with more than three-quarters
of all Americans having one. They are ideal for the financing
of consumer goods and services that one wants, but cannot
immediately afford. Alternatives such as "layaway" or individual
store credit are clearly inferior to a single plastic card accepted
essentially everywhere. Credit cards are also helpful for paying
for things that one can afford, as they greatly reduce transaction
costs compared to drafting a check or withdrawing cash from
an automated teller. Section 301 takes away all of those benefits
from 18- to 20-year-olds.
Further, credit cards are often the first step on the road toward
larger and more sophisticated debt, such as a home mortgage or a
car loan, as the interest rate for such debt depends on one's "credit
history." By denying 18- to 20-year-olds credit cards, section 301
deprives them of the ability to establish a credit history over those
years. Again, children ofwealthy parents need not worry, as their
parents can cosign for them to ensure they start their credit his-
tory as early as possible. But the children of modest backgrounds
will emerge as 21-year-olds without a credit history, forcing them
to pay higher interest rates and possibly affecting their chances
of landing a job. This is unfair and wrong.
Today's young people have registered their objections to sec-
tion 301. Shortly after the CARD Act was passed, the University
of Michigan's student newspaper complained that it "doesn't
respect the autonomy of college-aged individuals as legal adults
and hurts their financial independence" and suggested that the
"federal government should reevaluate the need to treat young
adults like children."
The age of capacity was settled in the 1970s and, absent a
massive social movement calling for reinstatement of the ancient
common-law rule, Congress should have left it alone. Unfor-
tunately, by treating 18- to 20-year-olds as infants, section 301
harms this cohort by denying them the legal ability to obtain a
credit card as the adults they are.
Contradicting policy favoring entrepreneurship | The young
people directly affected by section 301 of the CARD Act are
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not the only ones harmed by it; we all are. Entrepreneurship
is in the public interest, as it drives economic growth and job
creation, and modern-day entrepreneurs depend critically on
credit cards to finance their start-up companies. But section
301 withholds this crucial tool from potential youthful entre-
preneurs, thus making it much more difficult for them to start
their own businesses. This is clearly contrary to the strong
public policy favoring entrepreneurship.
All agree that entrepreneurship is vital for economic growth
and job creation in modern-day America and is therefore strongly
in the public interest. With respect to job creation-seen by many
as our most pressing need right now-recent scholarship reveals
that start-up firms in their first year have been responsible for
all net job creation in the United States since at least the 1970s,
having added about three million jobs per year, even during
recessions. While many of these start-ups eventually fold, those
that survive are often the type of companies that create satisfy-
ing employment opportunities and whose products or services
improve our quality of life.
Our leaders and policymakers have long understood the
importance of entrepreneurship to a thriving economy and
society. Congress has twice declared entrepreneurship to be a
national priority, a portion of all federal contract dollars are
statutorily required to go to small businesses, and the Small Busi-
ness Administration guarantees loans for small businesses and
provides free counseling and training to entrepreneurs. Similarly,
state and local governments endeavor to attract entrepreneurs to
their communities.
In short, entrepreneurship is in the public interest and start-
up companies are actively encouraged as a matter of public
policy. All of this is doubly true for youthful entrepreneurs, for
in addition to all the ordinary benefits of entrepreneurship just
discussed, youthful entrepreneurs add something unique: the
creativity and energy of youth. Experience shows that 18- to
20-year-olds are eager to challenge orthodox thinking and may
be able to offer fresh, new solutions to vexing problems. Perhaps
an older person could have founded Microsoft or Facebook, but
their founders demonstrated a heedlessness for convention that
is more commonly found in the young. The result is that these
companies have changed our world for the better.
Entrepreneurship is socially useful, but it is also notoriously
risky, with as many as half of all start-up companies shutting
their doors within a few years. Thus, although start-ups depend
critically on access to credit, banks and other traditional busi-
ness lenders generally refuse to extend credit to them. The risk/
reward ratio is simply too high for banks to lend to start-up
companies at any reasonable interest rate. Once a company has
established some sort of track record, a bank (or venture capital-
ist or angel investor) may be willing to lend-but the company
cannot reach that point unless it can launch in the first place
and survive its earliest days.
The result is that entrepreneurs are often left to seek financ-
ing from their own savings and their friends and family. But
many potential entrepreneurs have neither significant personal
savings nor wealthy relatives. With the bank's doors (under-
standably) closed, where can such a person go for a relatively
small amount of cash to start a new company? A credit card of
course, which provides an immediate line of credit with little
to no questions asked. Thus most entrepreneurs rely on credit
cards to finance their start-up companies, particularly in their
earliest days.
Even the most speculative ventures can be financed "on plas-
tic" -simply because the lender places no limit on the purpose for
which the credit can be used. This has greatly leveled the playing
field for aspiring entrepreneurs, allowing those who hail from
modest backgrounds to compete with those whose parents can
provide start-up funds. And some of these start-up acorns grow
into mighty oaks, such as Cisco Systems, CA Technologies, and
Spike Lee's film production studio, 40 Acres and a Mule. This is
all to the good.
By categorically withholding credit cards from 18- to 20-year-
olds, section 301 seriously impedes their ability to start a busi-
ness. This is clearly contrary to the strong and bipartisan public
policy favoring youthful entrepreneurship. And given the fact
that credit cards are the most important method of financing
early-stage start-ups, the effect is sure to be noticeable. Even
worse, the youthful entrepreneurs who are most in need of
credit card financing-those from modest backgrounds and
whose family and friends are not wealthy-will be the ones least
able to find a cosigner or demonstrate independent means of
repayment.
Today's youth are excited about entrepreneurship. A recent
survey found that 38 percent of 18- to 21-year-olds want to start
a business of their own. Despite the risks, many youths these
days see entrepreneurship as "a viable career path, not a renegade
choice." Unfortunately, section 301 is likely to defer, if not deny,
their business dreams because a credit card is a practical necessity
of a start-up in most cases. Had section 301 been in effect when
Microsoft or Facebook were founded, they might never have got-
ten off the ground. It is impossible to predict what companies will
not be founded thanks to section 301, but surely some will not,
and we will all be the worse off for it.
Section 301 of the Credit CARD Act, which denies credit cards
to those age 18-20, should be repealed. After much discussion
in the 1960s and 1970s, our society rejected the ancient com-
mon-law rule that one is an infant until age 21, and coalesced
around the view that legal adulthood begins at 18. That con-
sensus has not changed. Hence, by raising the age of contrac-
tual capacity to 21, section 301 contradicts the well-established
preferences of the public as well as the strong public policy
favoring entrepreneurship. Just as 18-year-olds are deemed by
the law to be sufficiently mature to enter into any other con-
tract-and mature enough to be drafted, vote, serve as a juror,
and be sentenced to death-then, a fortiori, they are mature
enough to hold a credit card.
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